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Management Briefing
In April 2000 the energy regulator removed the price constraints imposed at privatisation
from nearly half the households in the UK, those who paid for their gas or electricity by
monthly direct debit, with the remaining domestic gas prices to be deregulated in 2001 and
electricity in 2002. UK energy markets had been opened completely to new entrants between
1996 and 1998 for gas, and between 1998 and 1999 for electricity, a world first. The UK
energy regulator has reaffirmed his predecessors’ beliefs in the efficacy of competition, and
has made significant moves to transform his role in the retail market to one more like that of a
competition authority than a regulator.  The principal objective of the Gas and Electricity
Markets Authority, is “to protect the interests of consumers...wherever appropriate by
promoting effective competition...” (Utilities Act, 2000. pp 6 and 9); in doing so it should
have regard to the interests of individuals who are disabled or chronically sick, of
pensionable age, with low incomes, and residing in rural areas.  We offer direct empirical
evidence on the way in which consumers exercise choice in energy markets.  We then use it
to question whether the regulator is justified in considering that traditional ex ante regulation
is indeed redundant in these markets and that it can realistically be replaced by competition.
When the UK government opened up the gas market to competition, new suppliers responded
enthusiastically, offering consumers a choice amongst several competing firms and savings of
up to 20%.  But, as in telecoms, a market where choice has been available for much longer,
only a minority of consumers have switched gas supplier so far.  Given the continued
dominance of the incumbent firm (supplying about 70% of the market), we examine whether
the market can be regarded as competitive in a real sense.  In particular, we show why some
people switch while others do not.  We also examine whether some groups, particularly those
listed above, for which the regulator has statutory responsibility, are less likely to switch and
3are thus vulnerable to exploitation by the incumbent.  Finally we consider the implications for
regulatory policy and the continued removal of price caps.
In determining whether the market will become competitive, there are two issues we
consider.  First, is a minority - perhaps one third - of consumers actively in the market for a
new supplier sufficient to render the market competitive?  Secondly, the consumers who are
not switching suppliers are tolerating a considerable gap between the price they pay and the
lowest price available in the market.  Is it likely that consumers will become more willing to
switch supplier over time, so reducing this spread and hence the need for regulatory
intervention?
Based on our analysis we draw the following conclusions.  Most people, it seems, are
unlikely on present trends to change their gas supplier.  In the main, this is because although
they know they have the opportunity, they find the search costs too high relative to the
benefits to tempt them to make the move.  A subset of people are temperamentally
predisposed to making a change, but this group is not large enough to make a big impact on
the incumbent’s entrenched position. A significant group of customers is willing to tolerate
the incumbent’s prices being substantially above entrants’ prices.  As a result, the market is
unlikely to become very competitive because the incumbent left to itself will have an
incentive to keep prices high.
This is a rather pessimistic scenario, since it implies a somewhat friction-ridden operation of
the market mechanism in an important area of consumption for most people.  On our results,
a major part of the problem for smooth running relates more directly to search costs than
switching costs. Moreover, some of the more vulnerable not only have the least to gain from
shopping around (because of the payment methods available to them) but may also a lower
propensity to make a switch, even if equal gains were available to them.  If the market is to
work better, the process of finding a new more competitive supplier needs to become more
streamlined, in particular search costs need to be reduced, and consumers made aware that the
process is not, generally, beset with difficulty.   Both Oftel and Ofgem publicise comparisons
both of price and quality provided by different suppliers.  Our analysis suggests that this is a
valuable service, but additional effort to reduce search costs is necessary, along with
continued regulatory surveillance of the incumbent’s considerable market power.
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51. Introduction
In April 2000 the energy regulator removed the price constraints imposed at privatisation
from nearly half the households in the UK, those who paid for their gas or electricity by
monthly direct debit, with the remaining domestic gas prices to be deregulated in 2001 and
electricity in 2002. UK energy markets had been opened completely to new entrants between
1996 and 1998 for gas, and between 1998 and 1999 for electricity, a world first1. The UK
energy regulator has reaffirmed his predecessors’ beliefs in the efficacy of competition, and
has made significant moves to transform his role in the retail market to one more like that of a
competition authority than a regulator. 2  In July 2000 he stated: “Ofgem’s view [is] that as
competition develops, regulation should move from ex-ante requirements to ex-post
regulation, where action is only taken against the behaviour of market participants that has
harmful effects on customers and/or competition .… Ofgem believes that the Competition
Act 1998 can address anti-competitive behaviour that will cause appreciable harm to
customers or competitors in the gas and electricity supply markets.” (Ofgem, 2000a,
executive summary pp 2-3).
The principal objective of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, to which the regulator’s
duties are transferred under the Utilities Act, is “to protect the interests of
consumers...wherever appropriate by promoting effective competition...” (Utilities Act, 2000.
pp 6 and 9); in doing so it should have regard to the interests of individuals who are disabled
or chronically sick, of pensionable age, with low incomes, and residing in rural areas.  We
offer direct empirical evidence on the way in which consumers exercise choice in energy
markets.  We then use it to question whether the regulator is justified in considering that
traditional ex ante regulation is indeed redundant in these markets and that it can realistically
be replaced by competition.
                                                
1 In the US competition is being widely introduced for residential users, with similar ambitious plans to
deregulate the market.
2 This is clearly more difficult in the regulation of Transco, the National Grid company and the regional
distribution systems which are responsible for the pipes and wires.
6When the UK government opened up the gas market to competition, new suppliers responded
enthusiastically, offering consumers a choice amongst several competing firms and savings of
up to 20%.  But, as in telecoms, a market where choice has been available for much longer,
only a minority of consumers have switched gas supplier so far.  Given the continued
dominance of the incumbent firm, still supplying 72% of the market in September 2000
(Centrica, 2000), we examine whether the market can be regarded as competitive in a real
sense.  In particular, we show why some people switch while others do not.  We also examine
whether some groups, particularly those listed above, for which the regulator has statutory
responsibility, are less likely to switch and are thus vulnerable to exploitation by the
incumbent.  Finally we consider the implications for regulatory policy and the continued
removal of price caps.
In determining whether the market will become competitive, there are two issues we
consider.  First, is a minority - perhaps one third - of consumers actively in the market for a
new supplier sufficient to render the market competitive?  Secondly, the consumers who are
not switching suppliers are tolerating a considerable gap between the price they pay and the
lowest price available in the market.  Is it likely that consumers will become more willing to
switch supplier over time, so reducing this spread and hence the need for regulatory
intervention?
Switching between products is not confined to utility services, and there is a significant
literature which studies such behaviour. Rothschild (1974) has modelled the consumer’s
decision of how long to continue searching. Klemperer (e.g. 1989,1995) has developed a
considerable amount of theoretical work in the area.  He considers three types of switching
costs, of which transactions costs are the main category relevant to our decision.  Such costs
naturally make the individual firm’s demand more inelastic and so reduce rivalry.  Some
customers, with a high reservation price, may effectively be monopolised by the incumbent,
allowing the incumbent to sustain a higher price than entrants in the longer run3.  Knittel
(1997) examines telecoms switching behaviour in the US long distance market.  He seeks to
explain market power (the price-cost margin), in terms of search costs (a function of the
                                                
3 We do not here consider models dealing with several established suppliers over more than one time period.
7availability of market information for example on prices, advertising, etc. and the opportunity
cost of time) and switching costs, which in his market largely take the form of a fee for
switching.  Significantly, he attempts to distinguish between search and switching costs on
the basis that the fee is the direct measure of switching cost. Calem and Mester (1995) have
analysed consumer behaviour in the US credit card market and the consequences for interest
rates. Green (2000) presents a theoretical model of how switching costs may hinder
competition in a residential energy market.  There are few financial penalties for switching
suppliers, largely because the regulators have discouraged such penalties, but it is known
anecdotally that some consumers do explore the potential savings from switching and decide
it is not worth their while, suggesting some distinction between the perception of the two
costs.
There is also a literature in marketing which studies these issues, (see e.g. Bawa, 1990;
Purushottam and Krishnamurthi, 1992; Gilboa and Pazgal, 1995). Purushottam and
Krishnamurthi (1992) is probably the most relevant of these.  The basic premise of their
model is that choice history, that is the sequence of choices made in the past, affects every
choice decision.  There are two components: S for stay, describes the evolution in utility of
brand i, currently being consumed, whilst M for move, describes the evolution in utilities of
other brands j.  From this, we take the notion that consumer perceptions about brands
(particularly, in our case, perceptions about the incumbent and about the evolution of the new
entrants) matter, in addition to the more direct influence of prices.
Switching between gas suppliers is of a rather different nature from, say, choosing grocery
brands.  The decision takes on something of the character of investment decision.  In this way
it resembles both the telecoms and the credit card market.  In section 2 we outline our
economic modelling framework, then in section 3 we describe the data and discuss our
estimates using a double hurdle model which distinguishes awareness of opportunities to
change supplier from the contingent decision to take advantage of such an opportunity.
Section 4 presents the savings that people say they require before changing supplier, and
examines the implications for switching behaviour and the incumbent’s market power.
Section 5 concludes that the incumbent retains significant market power and suggests some
policy implications.
8The raw material for our paper comes from a specially commissioned questionnaire study
carried out for the authors. This was a follow-up study which took place around 12 months
later than our original survey, reported in Parmar, Waddams Price and Waterson (2000).  At
the time of the first survey, only a minority of consumers had had the opportunity to switch
gas suppliers, whereas by the time of the follow-up, all consumers were able to change.  We
obtained over 1100 useable responses to the survey.
2. The Modelling Framework
Consider the choice of a brand of yoghurt. Usually, all brands are arrayed in a common
section of the supermarket cool cabinet.  The consumer brings a purchasing history to the
decision, in terms of tastes and desires.  Experimenting is cheap; a mistake can be corrected
next week.  There are even easier choices to make, for example between bags of granulated
white sugar.
By comparison, choice between gas suppliers might be thought of as relatively complex.  The
good, like sugar, is essentially homogeneous.  However, the consumer is unused to making a
choice, given a purchasing history (of gas) which encompassed only one supplier, coupled
with an unfamiliar procedure (indeed, for some consumers, the conceptual leap involved in
the idea of a supplier using existing transportation equipment is considerable).  Consumers
may not even be aware of a choice, while this is obvious when products are displayed on the
supermarket shelves.  The incumbent supplier has no incentive to make switching easy4.  All
suppliers have an incentive to give biased advice, both in terms of comparisons with other
suppliers and in terms of the customers to whom they seek to give advice, though they do
have incentives to streamline the process of switching to them once a decision has been
reached.  In the current state of technology, it is not sensible for consumers to change
suppliers with great frequency since procedures must be undergone each time a new choice is
made, and suppliers may impose minimum supply periods, despite the regulator’s
discouragement.  Tariffs are complex and not easy to compare.
                                                
4 For historical reasons, the incumbent gas supplier faces a cost disadvantage on input prices.  The entrants incur
significant up-front costs which become sunk, so they have an incentive to avoid direct price competition.
Consumers do know several of these as suppliers of electricity.
9We therefore argue that the decision to change supplier has more in common with an
investment.  Time and effort are involved in making the decision and subsequently
implementing it, so that logically a change of supplier should only be made if the expected
benefits outweigh the costs.  We outlined our basic investment model in Parmar, Waddams
Price and Waterson (2000), and are able to develop this further in the current paper, based on
data when the gas market was fully open, and all the consumers interviewed had a choice of
suppliers.  One innovation is the attempt to draw a distinction between search and switching
costs.  The second sample round has the additional advantage that since all markets are open,
but some markets had been open for much longer than others, we can observe the effect of
this elapsed time on consumers’ awareness of competition.  This ‘awareness’ variable is a
significant innovation, and helps to explain some of the apparent contradictions in earlier
work.  In the early days of competition the regulatory office (now Ofgem) delivered a leaflet
to every household as gas competition was ‘rolled out’, but there is no requirement on the
incumbent supplier to send out with consumer bills a notice that they now have a choice.
Hence it is quite possible that some consumers remain unaware of their ability to choose.
Our underlying approach is that there are two stages in a consumer’s decision to switch away
from an incumbent energy supplier.  Accordingly, we analyse the decision as a double-
hurdle model.  First, the consumer must be aware they have the opportunity to switch.
Second, once aware, the benefits of switching must exceed the costs in order for them to
decide to move.  Of course, once the decision in principle to change supplier has been made,
a particular supplier must be chosen.  However, given the large number of suppliers available
compared with the size of our set of switchers, we do not model the choice of one alternative
supplier rather than another.  In the paragraphs below, we discuss the modelling of awareness
and of the decision to change supplier.
Awareness is likely to be influenced by factors relating to the importance of gas to the
consumer, by the general awareness of the consumer to changes in their environment, and by
the time which has elapsed since a choice has been available.  The importance of the product,
in turn, relates to the extent of consumption, the nature of the housing tenure, and possibly
income.  General awareness will potentially be influenced by education level, awareness (as
signalled by previous decisions) of similar changes in related services such as telephone
suppliers and car insurance, and perhaps demographics such as age.  In sum:
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A = a(Consumption, Tenure, Income, Education, Age, Telephone switching, Elapsed time)(1)
where A is a zero/ one variable.
Once aware of the possibility, consumers take a decision on whether to exercise their choice.
Here we draw both on our earlier model of costs and benefits and Green’s (2000) framework.
Generalising slightly from Green’s model, consumer j will move to the entrant e for which
the expression
                                 ),( eijej ppfsvB +−=                                                                 (2)
is maximised, subject to net benefits, B > 0, where v is the added value (if any) from the
entrant over the incumbent, s is the search plus switching cost, and f1 > 0, f2 < 0.  From our
standpoint, we may treat this as a useful reference to guide our empirical work. The larger is
B, the more likely it is that the consumer will change.  Clearly, the search and switching costs
will be dependent upon characteristics and perceptions of the individual or household
concerned and the nature of the market.
The gross benefits arising through price differences will depend upon consumption level and
expectations regarding future prices. Since we do not aim to model the choice of a specific
alternative to British Gas, we average benefits (“savings available”) over available
alternatives for consumers in that area with the relevant consumption characteristics.  But
additionally, consumers may differ in the weights they apply to current price differences as
opposed to other factors. For example, some consumers may feel that British Gas will be
forced to move its prices swiftly into line with competitors’ tariffs.  Also, in making a
decision, some customers may place more weight on their existing supplier’s reputation5 than
do others. Those who are constrained to using a prepayment meter make relatively small, if
any, financial savings by moving away from the incumbent6.
The costs come under two heads, search and switching costs and, to some extent at least, we
can distinguish between these.  In our earlier analysis, we concluded that the cost of changing
supplier is positively related to employment and age, and negatively related to income, on
search cost grounds.  But the latter relationship is potentially complex.  A higher income
implies a higher opportunity cost of deciding and executing the decision, so a lesser
                                                
5 This might alternatively be considered as a (dis) benefit or as a switching cost.
6 This is exacerbated by constraints on switching for some of these consumers because they are in debt to their
current supplier
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likelihood of changing. However consumption increases with income, but less than
proportionately (Bennett, Cooke and Waddams Price, 2000), so the link between income and
propensity to change may well be non-linear. Also, a higher income is likely to be related to a
higher educational attainment level (and hence, presumably, a quicker grasp of the essential
issues), so it is important to allow for educational differences. Search cost is also likely to be
negatively related to experience of switching previous services, particularly the telephone
supplier, since it implies experience with a similar decision.  In addition to this, studies of
branded-product switching behaviour indicate that loyalty is important.
In our empirical analysis we use the information about the different suppliers providing
telecom services in order to investigate the role of loyalty in the decision to switch. We
identify people using only British Telecom as a telephone service provider and those who use
other suppliers as an alternative to, or in addition to, BT. This allows us to capture the effect
of a ‘natural’ attitude towards switching together with the effect of positive experiences of
changing suppliers in other markets7. We are not able to measure loyalty directly, since prior
to 1996, consumers were forced to be “loyal”; however our survey provides information
about the importance attached to a supplier’s reputation (for brevity, “supplier reputation”)
when making the decision to change supplier. We would expect that people who consider
reputation as an important factor in this decision are likely to be loyal to their existing
supplier and therefore less inclined to take advantage of the savings available from changing
supplier. In addition to this, the evidence that a consumer has changed their car or household
insurance, as well as their switching behaviour concerning telephone service supplier, is
indicative of a consumer with a relatively low degree of loyalty.
So far as switching costs are concerned, the main factors that can unambiguously come under
this head are consumers’ estimates of time required to switch, ease of switching supplier, and
loyalty.
                                                
7 From a methodological point of view it could be argued that the variable identifying people who are
exclusively BT customers might be correlated with some unmeasured factors such as an ‘inclination to be loyal’
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To summarise we may write the probability of changing supplier as:
C = c(Savings available, Price expectations, Supplier reputation and expected behaviour,
Importance of savings; Income level, Various consumer characteristics, Previous switching
experience; Estimated time required, Ease of switching)           (3)
where the first set of factors relates most closely to gross benefits, the second set to search
costs, and the third set to switching costs.
By using the double hurdle model, examining the switching decisions and propensities only
of those who are already aware that they can choose supplier, we can isolate the effects more
clearly.  In contrast to our earlier work (Parmar et al, 2000), we have dropped any attempt to
capture risk and in this study we use consumption directly rather than relying on household
size (as an indirect measure).
3. Data and Results on Changing Supplier
Our data come from two separate but connected surveys, both specific to this project.  The
first group of observations relates to “survivors” of our first survey of consumer switching
behaviour8, namely people who agreed to be re-interviewed and were contacted by telephone;
observations of this group form a two-stage panel.  To these was added a booster sample of
randomly selected consumers.  The questions asked of this second group generated similar
information on personal characteristics (income, educational attainment, housing tenure, etc.)
to those we already know about for the first set, and were identical so far as switching
information is concerned.  The questionnaires asked about consumption of gas (via detailed
questions about their bill), factors which respondents considered important in changing
supplier, savings which respondents required in order to switch, the time they anticipated it
would take to switch, and switching of other types (e.g. telephone supplier).9
                                                                                                                                                       
causing mis-specification problems. This is unlikely to be the case in our analysis since we believe that we can
satisfactorily capture the ‘loyalty’ effect through the supplier’s reputation variable, as discussed below.
8 The results of this are reported in Parmar, Waddams Price and Waterson (2000).
9 We also asked equivalent questions about electricity.  At the time of our survey, not all customers had the
opportunity to switch electricity supplier.  Details on the specific questions asked are available by request from
the authors.
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Table 1 sets out the relevant broad characteristics of the groups in our surveys.  Round 1 is
part of an Omnibus survey undertaken by the Office of National Statistics, a stratified sample
designed to achieve national representativeness of respondents.  The sample reported here is
slightly smaller because it is restricted to heads of households who purchased gas.
Nevertheless the full round 1 sample is the most likely to be representative of gas-consuming
households.
Table 1 – Characteristics of the samples
Round 1 Survivors from Round 1 Booster sample
Number of respondents 1685 863 483
Own house/mortgage 1134 (67%) 644 (87%) 305 (63%)
Finished compulsory educ 1374 (82%) 749 (87%) 264 (68%)
BT only customer 1280 (76%) 655 (77%) 401 (83%)
DD payer 532 (32%) 304 (35%) 162 (34%)
PPM user 155 (9%) 57 (7%) 24 (5%)
Connected to gas 1354 692 411
Aware they can switch NA 597 (86%) 354 (86%)
Switched gas supplier [80 (6%)]* 140 (20%) 83 (20%)
*This figure is not directly comparable with those in columns 2 and 3, since round 1 was
undertaken a year earlier than the later surveys on which this paper is based.
House owners and those with higher educational qualifications amongst the full round 1
sample are more likely to have ‘survived’ to round 2, and those using prepayment meters less
likely to have done so, reflecting variations in mobility.  Prepayment meter users are also
under-represented in the booster sample, as are those who have finished compulsory
education10.  In other ways the three samples seem broadly similar. The changes in the
structure of the sample in the two rounds of interviews make it difficult to draw direct
comparisons between the results of our analysis and those contained in Parmar, Waddams
Price and Waterson (2000). However the main purpose of this work is not to compare
                                                
10 In one sense, under-representing prepayment customers is no bad thing assuming they are less likely to
change supplier, since the smaller the proportion of switchers, the less weight they have in the regression
analysis.
14
switching behaviour at different stages of development of competition, but rather to address
different aspects of the decision to change fuel supplier. This is reflected in the fact that
different questions were asked in the two rounds of the survey, such as the degree of
awareness and the importance of financial considerations in the decision to change supplier.
All the consumer data used in our estimations below come from this second round of
questioning.  On the supply side, information on the timing of the opening up of the regional
markets to competition came from Ofgas/ Ofgem, and the tariffs of the market participants
were obtained from the Which? (Consumers Association) web site.
Table 2 lists the key features of the decisions customers in our sample have made, and
compares this with the results of a MORI survey undertaken for Ofgas and the National Audit
Office in August 1998, shortly before the time of our survey.
Table 2 Comparative descriptive statistics
Whole sample (round 2) MORI survey August 1998
Number of respondents 1103 2511
Aware they can switch 951 (86%) 2360 (94%)
Number of switchers 223 (20%) 350 (14%)
Switched to Eastern Nat Gas 32 (14%) 22% ca.
Switched to Northern Energy 22 (10%)   0
Switched to Calortex 21 (9%) 7% ca.
Switched to Scottish Power 17 (8%) 7% ca.
Switched to Powergen 15 (7%) 7% ca.
Switched to Swalec 14 (6%) 7% ca.
Switched back to BG 19 (9%) NA
Switched to others 83 (37%) 50% ca.
Just over 20% of our sample had switched gas supplier away from the incumbent, the same
proportion as estimates suggest was the case in the population as a whole at this time (see
NAO, 1999).  However only 86% of our sample were aware that they could switch, compared
with 94% of the MORI sample, perhaps because the question was worded differently in the
two surveys.  In this paper we focus on the degree to which the market is developing, in terms
15
of explaining the degree of awareness and the decision to switch (or not), together with the
issue of the extent of savings which would be required in order to switch supplier.
We now turn to the empirical results. The next three tables are based on a Probit model
regression analysis aimed at identifying some of the main determinants of a dependent
variable which only takes values of zero and one. The modelling strategy for the empirical
analysis is based on the adoption of a general-to-specific approach, according to which all the
variables relating to the factors listed in equations (1) and (3) are initially included in the
regression equation and then eliminated from the analysis if not significant. Only the
parsimonious specification for these regression equations is reported in tables 3 to 5.
Table 3 shows the results of modelling consumer awareness, along the lines of equation (1)
above. Tables 4 and 5 examine the switching decision conditional on this (equation (3)), both
in terms of whether consumers who were aware of the choice had switched and whether they
were willing to switch suppliers.
One or more stars next to the coefficient value identify those variables whose effect was
significant at the conventionally accepted levels. For what we considered to be borderline
cases (significance levels between 10 and 15%) we report the value and sign of the
coefficient since we believe that they provide a useful indication of the direction of their
effect. For those variables which are significant only in one of the regressions (say for the
whole sample but not for ‘survivors’) we do not report a coefficient but mark their cells with
the symbol NS (not significant) in the relevant column.
In general, these results provide strong support for the idea of an investment model of
decision taking and give a clear picture of the important factors influencing a consumer’s
decision.  The results are also largely comparable between the “survivor” subgroup and the
entire set of observations, so we focus our discussion on the latter.  We consider first the
awareness results.
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Table 3 Double hurdle model of switching behaviour
All Probit estimations
Dependent variable: awareness of ability to switch amongst gas consumers
Round 1 survivors and booster
sample (connected to gas)
(1103)
Survivors from Round 1
(692)
Explanatory variable Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean
Gas consumption  0.87 ** 0.22 NS
Housing tenure  NS 0.56  ** 1
Education level  0.18 *** 0.76 NS
No. of OAPs NS -0.25 * 0.18
DD payer  0.15 0.4 NS
Stage of gas compet  0.12 *** 10.2  0.12 *** 10.3
Stage of compet ^2 -0.003 *** 146.6 -0.003 ** 148.5
PPM user -0.36 ** 0.07 -0.52 *** 0.08
BT only customer NS -0.23 0.74
NS = not significant (significant at 15% level or above). 
*** significant at 1% level
**   significant at 5% level
*     significant at 10% level
Awareness of switching possibilities is positively related to consumption, direct debit
payment (an opt-in method of payment), and home ownership, all of which indicate the
importance of gas to the consumer.  Educational attainment exerts a strong positive influence,
and age a negative influence, in the survivor sample.  Awareness is also strongly related to
the length of time which has elapsed since competition was introduced in each consumer’s
area, though this awareness tails off.  This is an important finding, indicating that as time
passes more people will become aware that they can switch supplier, but this tails off in a
pattern reminiscent of diffusion.   After a further 12 months of the market being open to
competition, we would expect the proportion of the population who is aware to have risen
significantly.  In other words, time itself should resolve lack of awareness about the
development of competition.
Given the natural evolution of awareness, though at a decreasing rate, we consider next the
choices of those who are aware they can switch. Many of the respondents believed that the
process of changing supplier would take a significant amount of time (the average
assessment, across the sample, was that it would take 1 day or more, whereas for most
consumers in practice it would take far less).  Therefore consumers view this as a significant
decision, not to be taken lightly.  We model two dependent variables: actually having
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switched supplier, and willingness to switch as indicated by having done so or being willing
to consider it. These results are reported in tables 4 and 5.
Table 4. Decision to switch conditional on being aware
All Probit estimations
Dependent variable: Has switched supplier, if aware of possibility
Round 1 survivors and booster
sample (connected to gas) 951
Survivors from Round 1
597
Explanatory variable Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean
Income level -0.59 ** 0.70 -0.5 0.75
Square income  NS NS
Savings available -0.02 * 3.4 NS
Housing tenure -0.35 ** 0.93 -2.1 *** 1
PPM user -0.58 ** 0.07 NS
Changed car or hhld insr  0.29 ** 0.09  0.3 * 0.14
BT only customer -0.32 *** 0.76 -0.35 *** 0.73
Est time required  NS -0.07 ** 22
Supplier reputation -0.22 *** 2.22 -0.3 *** 2.24
Importance of savings  0.26 *** 2.38  0.25 *** 2.4
BG reluctant to match 0.92 *** 0.09 0.92 *** 0.09
NS = not significant (significant at 15% level or above).
*** significant at 1% level
**   significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
Table 5. Decision to consider switching conditional on being aware
All Probit estimations
Dependent variable: switched or would consider it
Round 1 survivors and
booster sample (connected to
gas) 951
Survivors from Round 1;
597
Explanatory variable Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean
Income level -0.57 ** 0.70 -0.5 * 0.75
Square income  0.2 * 0.63  0.19 * 0.78
Savings available -0.02 3.4  NS
Housing tenure -0.36 ** 0.93 -0.61 * 1
PPM user -0.56 *** 0.07 -0.36 0.07
Changed car insur  0.21 0.11  0.22 0.17
BT only customer -0.38 *** 0.76 -0.46 *** 0.73
Supplier reputation -0.27 *** 2.22 -0.31 *** 2.24
Importance of savings  0.41 *** 2.38  0.41 *** 2.4
BG reluctant to match  1.14 *** 0.09  1.06 *** 0.09
NS = not significant (significant at 15% level or above).
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
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As expected, income does indeed have a complex effect on willingness to switch.  The
negative coefficient suggests that the opportunity cost of searching and switching is higher
for high income groups, but the fact that this effect tails off at higher income levels may
reflect higher educational levels, making the decision much quicker, and greater benefits
through higher consumption (as revealed through “savings available”).  Homeowners are less
likely to switch, provided that the consumer is aware of the possibility of switching.
Those who have switched telephone supplier are also more likely to change gas supplier, as
expected.  For these people there is, presumably, no conceptual leap involved11, and they may
also have a better idea of how complex (or straightforward) the process is.  Similar
conclusions can be drawn for people who have changed car and/or household insurance who
are also more likely to have switched. These results indicate that the decision to change fuel
supplier is strongly influenced by previous experiences of changing suppliers for the
provision of other services.
We attempted to capture the effect of the consumers’ loyalty to the incumbent supplier by
including in our regressions a dummy variable for those who attach great importance to the
suppliers’ reputation when making the decision to change suppliers. All the regression results
indicate that this group of people is less likely to switch. In addition, since we believe that
consumers’ expectations about the incumbent’s pricing behaviour are an important factor in
the decision to switch we also included in our regressions a dummy variable for those who
expect that British Gas, the incumbent supplier, will not match the new entrants’ prices. In
line with our expectations we find that this group is more likely to change supplier.
The importance of the supplier reputation and expectations about the incumbent’s prices,
together with the importance of expected savings, represent the most significant factors in all
our regressions in explaining the observed extent of switching in the residential energy
market. Indeed those who attach a greater importance to financial considerations in the
decision to switch are more likely to do so. This result is supported by the evidence that
prepayment meter users are less likely to switch, which reflects the lower potential savings
available for this group of consumers from switching. There is weak evidence that switching
                                                
11 For this reason we find it surprising that no significant effect of this factor was identified in the regression
equation modelling awareness.
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is inversely related to the estimated time required, though this is only significant for some of
those who have switched.
4. Savings required to switch and their implications
At the time of our surveys, only a small proportion of customers had switched supplier,
whilst others had contemplated it but not made the move.  Of our 880 non-switchers, only 93
answer positively that they would consider switching.  However, when faced with the
(hypothetical) possibility of particular levels of savings as a result of switching, significant
numbers do consider it, and we use this more specific response in our further analysis.  For
example, assuming monthly savings of £6 per month or more, 384 of our sample (almost
35%) say they would switch supplier. An amount of £6 per month represents a feasible
expectation both at the time the survey was carried out and at the time of writing, although
the actual amount of savings available for each customer will depend on consumption,
payment method and current supplier. Nearly 42% of those who had already switched at least
once would switch again for savings of £6 per month or more.
We first address the question of whether the market could be considered competitive with
only, say, a third of consumers actively considering a new supplier, by analysing the
particular monetary values for which consumers are willing to contemplate switching and the
likely behaviour of suppliers.  In Table 6 the information we gathered about consumers’
willingness to change supplier is used to assess the profitability of an incumbent which keeps
its prices above those of the new entrants. This exercise is aimed at providing some
quantitative measure of the extent of the monopoly power held by the incumbent, resulting
from exploitation of the costs that consumers attach to changing supplier.
Columns a and b in Table 6 show the numbers who, according to our survey, would switch
for particular monetary amounts.  By subtraction, column c shows the increment of
consumers who would switch away as a result of the increment in incumbent price above the
level of an entrant’s price.  This in turn yields the marginal revenue for the incumbent from
successive price increases above any given level, that is the difference between the supplier’s
gains through higher margins from the consumers who remain with it (column d), and the
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losses from those who leave for another supplier (column e)12.  Until the monthly saving from
switching supplier goes beyond £8, the net gain for the incumbent is positive, and thereafter
negative.  Suppose that the lowest price an entrant can charge is a competitive one, reflecting
marginal cost at current material prices ; the incumbent will find it profitable to maintain a
price £8 per month, or almost £100 per year, above that level.  Around 59% of customers will
remain “loyal” to such an incumbent.
 Therefore, a majority of customers will be paying a price around 33% above the competitive
level, even on the most favourable assumptions.  This is hardly the hallmark of a strongly
competitive market, a similar conclusion to the one drawn in Green (2000)13.  Our analysis is
conducted for all consumers, a fraction of whom were not aware of competition when the
survey took place; this offers some limited hope for improvements as more consumers
become aware of the options over time.
                                                
12 For simplicity, this calculation assumes that the consumers who leave are in some sense average consumers.
This may slightly overestimate the revenues to the incumbent, since consumption pattern does have some effect
on likelihood of switching, as the results in tables 4 and 5 show.  However, those results also show that the main
factors in identifying a switcher are not consumption pattern, so the impact of this simplification is likely to be
minor.
13 In that sense, we provide an alternative, arguably more direct, answer to the question examined by Green
(2000).
21
Table 6: Benefits for British Gas of keeping price above competitors’ price levels
(derived from numbers of consumer switches at various monthly savings levels















A b c d e d-e
1 16
2 58 42 1045 42 1003
4 197 139 1812 278 1534
6 384 187 1438 748 690
8 454 70 1298 420 878
10 711 257 784 2056 -1272
12 736 25 734 250 484
14 759 23 688 276 412
16 809 50 588 700 -112
20 854 45 996 720 276
Sample 1103
Source: Direct calculations from survey results.  It can be readily confirmed that it is not profitable for British
Gas to widen the differential above £8 per month.
Nevertheless, the willingness of consumers to remain with the incumbent even with
considerable price differentials suggests considerable market power for the incumbent in the
market as a whole.   Moreover there are concerns that such power is particularly strong
amongst groups for which the regulator has special responsibility, i.e. those who are disabled
or chronically sick, of pensionable age and with low income14.   To identify any differential
market power over these groups, we examined the effect of these characteristics on a
consumer’s willingness to switch for savings of £6 per month or more.  We interpret lower
willingness to switch as coincident with greater market power for the incumbent, and
potential vulnerability to exploitation.  The full results are shown in table 7.
                                                
14 The data do not allow us to identify directly those customers who live in rural areas or those in receipt of
disability benefits. However we intend to carry out further analysis of these groups of customers in future, based
on information available in the data set.
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Table 7 Probit model of the decision to switch for savings of £6 per month
Dependent variable: would switch for  £6 savings per month or more (0/1)
All observations
(connected to gas mains) 1103
Survivors from Round 1
692
Would switch N=384 N=265
No of switchers N=93 N=65
Explanatory variable Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean
Consumption level -1.11 *** 0.22 -1.2  *** 0.21
Tenure -0.35 *** 0.93 -0.8 *** 1
Education level  0.25 *** 0.76 0.35 * 0.89
No. of OAPs  0.3 *** 0.13 0.6 *** 0.17
Proxy for risk avers NS 0.07 * -1.2
DD payer   0.46 *** 0.42 0.36 *** 0.44
Stage of gas comp -0.01 * 10.2 -0.02 ** 10.3
BT only customer -0.19 ** 0.77 NS
Swd*income  NS 0.54 * 0.14
Swd*cons -1.2 * 0.04 NS
Swd*risk NS -0.17 * -0.26
Swd*tenure  0.5 *** 0.19 -1 ** 0.2
Swd*stage NS  0.0 ** 2.2
Swd*hh ins -0.46 * 0.02 -0.7 ** 0.03
NS = not significant (significant at 15% level or above).
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
Of the groups for which the regulator has special responsibility, we note that old age
pensioners are more likely to switch for a given sum, perhaps because they have more time in
which to make the decision; but we have noted that they are less likely to be aware of the
possibility, perhaps accounting for the apparently contrary result in earlier studies.  A higher
level of education means a person is more likely to switch for a given amount of savings, or
in other words those of lower educational attainment are more likely to remain with the
incumbent. Amongst other characteristics, we note that those who have switched telephone
supplier are also more likely to move for a given amount, presumably because they are
temperamentally disposed to switching or have had positive experiences of switching in other
markets.  Direct debit payers, who have made a conscious decision regarding their supply
contract, are more inclined to switch for a given sum.  As competition develops, people are
less likely to switch for a given saving, maybe because the more inclined have already
switched.
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Finally, there are some differences between those who have switched and those who have
not, in terms of behaviour concerning subsequent switches.  Those with higher income who
have switched are more likely to do so again, for a further saving of at least £6. Our analysis
does not allow us to identify any significant effects of income for people who have not
changed supplier. However it is possible that the effect of income is captured by our
education level variable given the positive correlation between them. We also know that
consumption levels, a significant variable in our analysis, are related to income although they
do not grow proportionally (see comments on page 6). These results suggest that those of
pensionable age are not especially vulnerable to exploitation by the incumbent, but those on
low incomes may be.
5. Concluding Comments
We conclude the paper by returning to examine the questions raised in the introduction.  Most
people, it seems, are unlikely on present trends to change their gas supplier.  In the main, this
is because although they know they have the opportunity, they find the search costs too high
relative to the benefits to tempt them to make the move.  A subset of people are
temperamentally predisposed to making a change, but this group is not large enough to make
a big impact on the incumbent’s entrenched position. A significant group of customers is
willing to tolerate the incumbent’s prices being substantially above entrants’ prices.  As a
result, the market is unlikely to become very competitive because the incumbent left to itself
will have an incentive to keep prices high.
This is a rather pessimistic scenario, since it implies a somewhat friction-ridden operation of
the market mechanism in an important area of consumption for most people.  On our results,
a major part of the problem for smooth running relates more directly to search costs than
switching costs.15  Moreover, some of the more vulnerable not only have the least to gain
from shopping around (because of the payment methods available to them) but may also a
lower propensity to make a switch, even if equal gains were available to them.  If the market
is to work better, the process of finding a new more competitive supplier needs to become
more streamlined, in particular search costs need to be reduced, and consumers made aware
that the process is not, generally, beset with difficulty.   Both Oftel and Ofgem publicise
                                                
15 Of course, the regulator has made deliberate attempts to reduce switching costs.
24
comparisons both of price and quality provided by different suppliers16.  Our analysis
suggests that this is a valuable service, but additional effort to reduce search costs is
necessary, along with continued regulatory surveillance of the incumbent’s considerable
market power.
                                                
16 However, so far as gas and electricity are concerned, these would be made more direct if consumers could




Consumption level Estimated level of monthly gas consumption (KWh) based on size
of bill and relevant tariff applied by supplier
Income level Gross yearly personal income of respondent in £, divided by
10000
Square Income Squared value of income level
Housing tenure 1 if respondent owns house outright or owns with mortgage, 0
otherwise
Education level 1 if respondent has completed compulsory education, 0 otherwise
No. of OAPs Number of people above 65 years of age in the household
DD payers 1 if gas payments are made by direct debit, 0 otherwise
PPM user 1 if gas prepayment meter is installed in the house, 0 otherwise
BT only customer 1 if telephone services are provided only by British Telecom, 0
otherwise
Changed car or hhld ins 1 if respondent has changed company providing car or household
insurance in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
Stage of Gas competit Number of months since competition was introduced in the area
where respondent lives
Stage of compt^2 Squared value of number of months since competition introduced
Savings available Difference between current monthly bill and alternative bill that
would have to be paid if supplied by cheapest supplier, based on
range (low, medium, high) of consumption levels, area, and
current payment method.
Est time required 1 if estimated time required to change supplier is less than an
hour, 6 if half a day, 12 if 1 day or more
Supplier reputation 1 if respondent considers the supplier’s reputation as a very
important/important factor in deciding whether to change supplier,
0 otherwise
Inportance of savings 1 if respondent considers the level of savings offered as a very
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